		Safety Canada Online			Hot Issues			Awards			Campaigns

Home > News > Vol. XLVII No. 4, October 2003

Safety Goes First

When the space shuttle Columbia was destroyed in February 2003 seven astronauts died. The report on the disaster reveals it was the result of safety practices that had been flawed for 20 years. Even after the Challenger blew up in 1986, also killing seven astronauts, NASA made no improvements to its safety systems.

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board report was released in August 2003. It found that NASA mission managers accepted flaws in the system as normal. They did not recognize that these problems could lead to a catastrophe, and they discouraged dissenting voices.

The government and upper echelons of NASA exerted constant pressure to reduce or at least freeze operating costs for the shuttle. Safety and support upgrades were delayed or deferred, and the infrastructure was allowed to deteriorate. To stay on schedule, NASA accepted more and more risk. The disaster resulted from a problem that was well known to NASA engineers.

The report's findings should give us all pause. Cutbacks may be inevitable. Governments must control costs. The private sector must stay competitive. However, it is false economy to cut back on safety. Time and time again, costly, preventable catastrophes happen because potential risks in the system are accepted as normal. Time and time again, improvements to safety-related infrastructure are marginalized and considered "frills." Complacency must never be allowed to take hold when it comes to safety.

Risk management, a systematic approach to prevent or reduce exposure to losses, must always be a key priority.

Safety Canada October 2003

Weighing the Risks

Letter from National Defence Headquarters